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NOTE
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS IN NONMARITAL
COHABITATION: A PROPOSAL FOR RECOVERY
The property rights of unmarried cohabitants at the termination of their
relationship has been a source of litigation for decades) The dramatic in-
crease in the number of persons living together without marriage in recent
years 2 has underscored the necessity for courts to formulate clear standards
to apply in determining the financial rights and responsibilities of nonmarital
partners. In 1Y7ti, the Supreme Court of California was called upon to formu-
late such standards in the highly-publicized and controversial case of Marvin
v. Marvin. 3
The plaintiff, Michelle Triola Marvin, brought suit against the defen-
dant, celebrity Lee Marvin. to enforce a contract under which she claimed to
be entitled to support payments and to half the property accumulated by the
parties during their seven years of cohabitation.`' The First cause of action, a
request for declaratory relief, sought a determination of her contract and
property rights.' The second sought t he imposition of a constructive trust on
one half of the property." The trial court rendered judgment for the defen-
dant on the pleadings,' After the plaintiff's motion to amend- the complaint
was denied, she appealed to the California Supreme Court." The court held
that the complaint furnished a suitable basis upon which relief could be
granted and that the trial court had erred in granting the defendant's motion
for judgment. on the pleadings.•
' See, e.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Vallera v.
Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 76] (1943); Garcia v. Venegas, 1116 Cal. App. 2d
364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951); Jones v. _Jones, 313 Ky. 367, 231 S.N.V.2(1 15 (1950); Tvranski
v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570. 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Bench v. Howe, 71 S.D. 288,
23 N.W.2d 744 (1946); Creasman v, Boyle, 31 Wash, 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
• Census figures for 1977 indicate that nonmarital cohabitation increased
eighty-three per cent in the years between 1970 and 1977. M Plotkin, United States
Population: Changing Population Patterns, 1979 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS
205, 905,
3 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cat. Rptr. 815 (1976). For legal com-
mentary on the Marvin decision, see, e.g., Kay and Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin; Preserving
the Options, 65 CAL. 1.. REV. 937 (1977); Branca, A Practitioner's Guide to the Wages of Sin:
Marvin v. Marvin, 52 I..os ANGELES B. J. 502 (1977); Note, Property Rights of De Facto
Spouses. 90 HAttv, 1,. Rev. 1708 (1977); Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for quasi-
Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. Rev. 359 (1978); Casenote, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 947
(1977); Casenote, 411 U. Cm 1.. REV. 924 (1977).
4 18 Cal. 3d at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
• Id. at 666. 557 P.2d at 110-11, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
• Id., 557 P.2d at 1 11, 134 Cal. Rim - , at 820.
7 Id. at 667, 557 P.2d at. 114, 1 34 Cal. Rptr. at 820. The defendant originally
had demurred unsuccessfully to the plaintiff's allegations. Following extensive discov-
ery and pretrial proceedings, the case went to trial, ;u which time the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss. The court treated this motion as one for judgment on the pleadings
because of a stipulation previously made by the parties. hi. at 666-67, 557 P.2d at lll,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
8 Id. at 667, 557 P.2d at Il l,  134 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
Id. at 675. 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. justice Tobriner wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Wright and justices McComb, Mosk, Sulli-
Nri9
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In its 1932 decision of Trutalli v. Meraviglia,'" the California court had
held that a man and woman who live together without being legally married
are nevertheless competent to make a valid agreement to share property ac-
quired during the relationship, as long as the illegal cohabitation does not
form the consideration for the property agreement." Thus, following
Trutalli and its progeny, the Marvin court determined that agreements like the
one alleged by the plaintiff fail only to the extent that they rest explicitly
upon a consideration of sexual relations.' 2
 The court further stated that, in
the absence of an express agreement, courts might grant relief in implied
contract or in equity.' 3 Finding that the express agreement alleged by the
plaintiff did not rest upon an unlawful consideration, the court reversed the
trial court judgment and remanded the case."
On remand, the trial court found that neither the words nor the conduct
of the parties indicated an express" or implied 16
 agreement to share prop-
erty. In addition, the evidence adduced by the trial court failed to justify im-
position of the equitable remedies of resulting or constructive trust suggested
by the California Supreme Court." The trial court nevertheless awarded the
plaintiff' $104,000 for rehabilitation," stating that it was following the su-
preme court's instructions to employ additional equitable remedies if war-
ranted by the circumstances of the case.'`'
The reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Marvin has been cited
and adopted by several other state supreme courts in the years since the deci-
van und Richardson concurred. Justice Clark filed a concurring and dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
1 " 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932).
Id. at 701-02, 12 P.2d at 431.
12
 Id. at 670-71, 557 P.2d at 113. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
' 3 Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
14 Id. at 684-85. 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
Marvin v. Marvin, [19791 5 ('AM. L. REP. (BNA) 3077, 3081 (Cal. Super. Ct.
April 17, 1979).
'" Id. at 3082.
17 Id. ai 3084. These theories had been suggested by the supreme court in
Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The supreme court
had also indicated that courts might fairly apportion property accumulated through
"mutual effort." Id. at 682, 557 1 1 .2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. The trial court
indicated that it was unable to find in the instant action mutual effort that would
warrant division of the defendant's property. 5 Fast. L. REP. at 3085. For a discussion
of the plaintiff's mutual effort argument and the trial court's resolution of the issue,
see text at notes 160-72 and notes 202-13 infra.
'" 5 FAm. L. REP. at 3085. The sum was awarded so that Ms. Marvin could
learn new employment skills or refurbish those previously utilized. Id. The superior
court indicated that Ms. Marvin should be able to accomplish rehabilitation 1re.tar...ta .on .n less than
two years. Id. n.18. It further noted that the amount of the award would be approxi-
mately equivalent to the amount of money the plaintiff would earn in two years at the
highest scale of wages she had ever received, $1000 a week. Id. The court added that
some of the funds might be used for living expenses, but that, their primary purpose
was for retraining. Id. n.19.
'" Id. at 3085. These instructions are found in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at
684 n.25, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25.
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sion. 2 ° A 1979 decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois, however, illustrates
the problems which plaintiffs may face in jurisdictions without California's
history of favorable treatment of the claims of unmarried cohabitants.
The plaintiff in Hewitt v. Hewitt' had originally filed a complaint for
divorce against the defendant, with whom she had lived for fifteen years. 22
The trial court dismissed the complaint when the plaintiff admitted that she
and the defendant had never obtained a marriage license or participated in a
marriage ceremony. 23 The court found, however, that certain property was
held in joint tenancy, and directed the plaintiff to amend her complaint to
make it more definite as to the nature of such property." The amended
complaint sought equal division of the property held in joint tenancy or in the
defendant's name, on the basis of express oral contract, implied contract, con-
structive trust and equitable principles. 25 This complaint was also dismissed
by the trial court, which found that Illinois law and public policy required such
claims to be based on a valid marriage." The appellate court reversed, hold-
ing that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action on an express oral
contract." In reversing the appellate court judgment, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that enforcement of a contract between unmarried cohabitants
would contravene Illinois public policy." The court determined that en-
forcement would violate the purpose of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act to "strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and
safeguard family relationships."" In addition, the Hewitt court was unwilling
to embrace "the naivete we believe involved in the assertion that there are
involved in these [nonmarital] relationships contracts separate and indepen-
dent from the sexual activity." 3 "
The Illinois Supreme Court in Hewitt adopts traditional contentions
which have been raised in the past to bar recovery for unmarried cohabi-
tants.' In contrast, Marvin represents an alternative viewpoint, illustrating
the arguments of those who have proposed that nonmarital partners should
be able to assert their claims in court. 32 This Note will analyze the validity of
recovery between unmarried cohabitants and the theories upon which such
2 " See, e.g.. Carlson v. Olson,	 Minn.	 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977); Koz-
lowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577
l'.2(.1 507 (1978).
21 77 II '2d 49, 394 N.E.2c1 1204 (1979).
22 Id. at 52, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
23 Id .
24 62 111. App. 3d 861, 862, 380 N.E.2d 454, 456 (1978).
25 Id. at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 459.
20 Id. at 863, 380 N.E.2d at 456.
27 Id. at 867, 380 N.E.2c1 at 459.
" 77 III. 2d at 66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211. Mr. Justice Underwood delivered the
opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court.
2" Id. at 61-62, 394 N.E.2d at 1209, quoting lu., REv. STAr. ch . 40, § 102(2)
(1977).
7 " Id. at 60, 394 N.E.2c1 at 1209.
'I See text at notes '221-23 and 231-33 infra.
32 See, e.g., Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the
Value of Homemaker's Services, 10 F Am. L.Q. 101 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bruch].
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recovery logically may be based. First, the opinions of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Hewitt and the California Supreme Court in Marvin will he
examined. Next, the Note will critically examine the opinion a'nd order of the
trial court on remand in Marvin to determine whether that court correctly
interpreted the California Supreme Court opinion, and whether the dissent's
criticisms of the majority opinion were borne out. It will be submitted that,
because of its failure to apply correctly the instructions of the California Su-
preme Court, the trial court not only illustrated some of the dissent's con-
cerns, but also added force to the Hewitt court's apprehension that recovery
for unmarried cohabitants could amount to judicial reinstatement of common
law marriage. Finally, the Note will propose general guidelines for courts de-
termining the property rights and financial obligations of unmarried cohabi-
tants. It will be suggested that courts follow the lead of the California Supreme
Court's Marvin decision insofar as it proposes the application of recognized
principles of contract law and equity in order to protect the parties reason-
able expectations and to prevent unjust enrichment. It will be further submit-
ted that, in the absence of evidence authorizing recovery under accepted legal
and equitable theories, no recovery should be granted.
I. THE OPINIONS IN HEIviTT AND MARVIN
A. Hewitt v. Hewitt: A Traditional Approach to Nonmarital Cohabitation
The appellate court decision which the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed
in Hewitt quoted extensively from the California Supreme Court's Marvin
opinion , 33 and concluded that the Marvin court's reasoning is particularly
persuasive upon the allegations here pleaded wherein plaintiff has alleged
facts which demonstrate a stable family relationship extending over a long
period of time." 34 Thus, the appellate court determined that, because the
relationship of the parties so closely resembled a conventional marriage, the
plaintiff's conduct had not "so affronted public policy that she should be de-
nied any and all relief," 33
 and held that her complaint stated a cause of action
in express oral contract!'" The Illinois Supreme Court, however, refused to
adopt similar reasoning. Indeed, the conventional aspects of the parties' rela-
tionship, which the appellate court found so convincing, were instrumental in
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision that recovery under these circumstances
would contravene Illinois public policy. The court noted: "In our judgment.
the fault in the appellate court holding in this case is that its practical effect is
the reinstatement of common law marriage, for there is no doubt. that. the
alleged facts would, if proved, establish such it marriage under our pre-1905
law "37
33 62 III, App. 3d at 865-68, 380 N.E.2d at 458-60.
34 fit, at 868, 380 N.E.2c1 at 460.
35
 hi. at 869, 380 N.E.2d at 460.
'" Id. at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 959.
37 77 111. al at 65, 394 N.E.2d at 1211 (citations omitted). ILL. REV. STAT. ch .
40, § 214 (1977) provides that common law marriages contracted after June 30, 1905
are invalid.
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The plaintiff alleged that, after she became pregnant in 1960, the defen-
dant had assured her that they were married and that no ceremony was
necessary." She further alleged that he had promised to "share his life, his
future, his earnings and his property" with her, and that she in turn had
given him "every assistance a wife and mother could give.'" At the time of
the trial, the defendant was a successful professional, earning more than
$80,000 a year, and the plaintiff claimed that his success was due to her fi-
nancial, professional, social and personal contributions." Against that factual
background, the plaintiff claimed entitlement in equity to a one-half share of
the defendant's property, because of his promise to share his property and
earnings with her and because the property had been acquired through the
parties' joint endeavors. 4 ' She also alleged that the conduct of the parties
evidenced an implied contract which entitled her to half the property. 24 I n
addition, she claimed that the defendant's fraudulent assurances that she was
his wife justified the impression of a trust on his property, and that he had
been unjustly enriched by her detrimental reliance on his promises."
In its discussion of the plaintiff's claims, the Illinois Supreme Court first
criticized the appellate court's reliance on Marvin. The court noted that the
Marvin decision had authorized recovery under "a pure contract theory,
under which .. , the pseudoconventional family relationship which impressed
the appellate court here is irrelevant."' The Illinois court indicated that it
was in any event unwilling to adopt the California Supreme Court's reasoning.
The court recognized that the issue of recovery fin - unmarried cohabitants
might. involve more than the application of common law principles of express
contract:15 Remarking that Marvin had also authorized recovery under com-
mon law principles of implied contract. and equity, the Hewitt court intimated
that the recognition of these theories of recovery would amount to granting
property rights to nonmarital partners merely on the basis of cohabitation and
subsequent separation." The court. Rafter stated that_ judicial recognition of
36 77 111. 2d at 53, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
Id. at 54, 3114 N.E.2d at 1205.
" Id. at 53-54. 394 N.E.2d at 1205. The plaintiff had obtained financial assis-
tance from her parents in order to aid the defendant in his education and in the
estahlishment. of his practice of pedodontia. In addition, she had received payroll
checks for her assistance in the defendant's practice, but had placed them in a com-
mon fund. Id.
" Id. at 53, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
42 Id .
43 Id.
4 Id. at 51), 394 N.E.2d at 1207.
45 Id.
46 The court
Plaintiff argues that because her action is founded on an express contract,
her recover,' would in no way imply that unmarried cohabitants acquire
property rights merely by cohabitation and subsequent separation. How-
ever, the Marvin court expressly recognized and the appellate court here
seems to agree that if common law principles of express contract govern
express agreements between unmarried cohabitants, common law princi-
ples of iinplied contract, equitable relief and constructive trust must govern -
the parties' relations in the absence. of such an agreement. ... I n all prob-
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the claims of unmarried cohabitants presents a "more fundamental problem"
than the mere application of contract principles or considerations of equity or
fairness between the parties.'" The court determined that lolf substantially
greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of
such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage,"" and
proceeded to examine the public policy issues it found to be relevant in ad-
judicating such claims.
First, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that changes in societal
attitudes toward nonmarital cohabitation justify modification of the Illinois
policy that "fain agreement in consideration of future illicit cohabitation ... is
void."'" The court acknowledged that courts in other jurisdictions had en-
forced contracts between nonmarital partners by severing the portion of the
contract based on sexual services from the portion calling for legal exchange
of property or services,5 ° but it refused to adopt that rationale.'' The Illinois
court determined that the real issue was "whether it is appropriate for this
court to grant a legal status to a private arrangement substituting for the
institution of marriage sanctioned by the State," 52 and found that such a pub-
lic policy decision should originate in the legislature, "in the exercise of its
traditional authority to declare public policy in the domestic relations field." 53
Second, the court reasoned that judicial recognition of the claims of un-
married cohabitants would contravene the policy of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act." One of the purposes of that Act is to
"strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard family rela-
tionships." 55
 The court expressed its belief' that allowing recovery would
make cohabitation too attractive an alternative to marriage, thus violating that
purpose." In addition, the Illinois court determined that the legislature's
decision to retain fault grounds in divorce prbceeclings 57
 "prevents the mar-
ability the latter case will be much the more common, since it is unlikely
that most couples who live together will enter into express agreements reg-
ulating their property rights.
14. at 56-57, 394 N.E.2d at 1207 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 57-58, 394 N.1.."..2c1 at 1207.
48 Id. at 58, 394 N.E.2d at 1207.
49 77 111. 2c1 at 59-60, 394 N.E.2d at 1208, quoting Wallace v. Rappleye, 103
111. 229, 249 (1882).
5° See, e.g.. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rpir.
815 (1976); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 43 (1932): Tyranski v. Pig-
gins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Carlson v. Olson. Minn.  , 256
N.W.2d 249 (1977); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 002 (1979).
51 77 111. 24 at 59-60. 394 N.E.2d at 1208-09.
32 Id. at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
53 Id.
54 ILL. Riv. STA -r. ch . 40, § 101-802 (1977).
" Id. at	 102(2).
" 77 Ill. 2d at 61-62, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
37 ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 40, § 401 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
The court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage (f(srmerly
known as divorce) if:
(2) the court finds that, without cause or provocation by the
petitioner: either party has committed adultery subsequent to the marriage,
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riage relation from becoming in effect a private contract terminable at will,"
and indicates that "public policy disfavors private contractual alternatives to
marriage." 58 Finally, the court found that the legislature's recent decision to
grant the rights of a legal spouse to a putative spouse, but not to knowingly
unmarried cohabitants," represented further legislative disapproval of recov-
ery for nonmarital partners. 60
The Hewitt court concluded that "we do not intend to suggest that plain-
tiff's claims are totally devoid of merit," but that the questions involved in the
dispute were within the province of the legislature, not the courts." With
those remarks, it reversed the appellate court decision and reinstated the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. 62
While the Illinois Supreme Court based its decision in Hewitt primarily
on deference to legislative judgment, the California Supreme Court in Marvin .
regarded the rights of unmarried cohabitants as a uniquely judicial issue."
or has wilfully deserted or absented himself or herself from the husband
or wife for the space of one year, or has been guilty of habitual drunken-
ness for the space of 2 years, or has been guilty of gross and confirmed
habits caused by the excessive use of addictive drugs for the space of 2
years, or has attempted the life of the other by poison or other means
showing malice, or has been guilty of extreme and repeated physical or
mental cruelty, or has been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime
or has infected the other with a communicable venereal disease...
Id.
58 77 Ill. 2d at 64, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
" ILL REV. STAT. ch . 40, § 305 (1977) provides:
Any person, having gone through a marriage ceremony, who has
cohabited with another to whom he is not legally married in the good faith
belief that he was married to that person is a putative spouse until know-
ledge of the fact that he is not legally married terminates his status and
prevents acquisition of further rights. A putative spouse acquires the rights
conferred upon a legal spouse, including the right to maintenance follow-
ing termination of his status, whether or not the marriage is prohibited,
under Section 212, or declared invalid, under Section 301. If there is a
legal spouse or other putative spouse, rights acquired by a putative spouse
do not supersede the rights of the legal spouse or those acquired by other
putative spouses, but the court shall apportion property, maintenance and
support rights among the claimants as appropriate in the circumstances
and in the interests of justice. This Section shall not apply to common law
marriages contracted in the State after June 30, 1905.
Id.
"" 77 III. 2cl at 64, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
" 1 Id. at 66, 394 N.E.2c1 at 1211.
"2 Id.
1i3 The court noted: "The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the
distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a relationship
remains subject solely to judicial decision. - 18 Cal. 3d at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 139 Cal.
Rptr. at 819. It further stated: "The delineation of the rights of nonmarital partners
before 1970 had been fixed entirely by judicial decision: we see no reason. to believe
that the Legislature, by enacting the Family Law Act, intended to change that state of
affairs." Id. at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rpt.r. at 829. These remarks were made
in conjunction with the court's discussion of In re Marriage of Cary and Estate rf Atherley,
two California court of appeal decisions discussed in the text accompanying notes
202-13 infra.
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B. Marvin v. Marvin: An Alternative Approach
The facts confronted by the California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Mar-
vin . were similar to those in Hewitt. The plaintiff in Marvin alleged that she
and the defendant had entered into an oral agreement in October, 1968,
which provided that they would live together and share equally any and all
property accumulated as a result of their individual or combined efforts."
The plaintiff at that time allegedly agreed to render her services as a
homemaker and companion to the defendant. 65 She further claimed to have
given up her "lucrative career as an entertainer and singer" in return for the
defendant's promise to provide for her financial support for the rest of her
life.''`'
In examining the plaintiff's allegations to determine whether they stated
a cause of action, 67 the California Supreme Court, unlike the Illinois court,
had at its disposal a substantial body of case law, beginning with its 1932
decision in Trutalli v. Meraviglia." The plaintiff based her cause of action on
the principle set forth in Trutalli, whereby unmarried cohabitants may lawfully
contract concerning property acquired during their relationship." The de-
fendant contended that the alleged contract was so closely connected with the
"immoral" character of the relationship that its enforcement would contravene
public policy." He asserted that former decisions had held that a contract
"involved in" 7 ' or made in "contemplation" of 72 a sexual relationship would
64 Id. at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819. During the period of
cohabitation, the defendant had acquired in his name "substantial personal and real
property," including motion picture rights worth more than one million dollars. Id.
.	 Id .
56 Id .
67 Id. at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal, Rptr. at 819. The supreme court
accepted as true the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, in order to determine
whether they stated or could be amended to state a cause of action. Id.
' 215 Cal. 698, 12 P2d 430. Sec text at notes 10 and 11 supra. Although
Trutalli's general principle had been upheld on numerous subsequent occasions, see,
e.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943); Croslin v. Scott,
154 Cal. App. 2c1 767, 771, 316 P.2d 755, 758 (1957); Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal.
App. 2d 359, 362, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (1954), the decisions did not provide a clear stan-
dard for determining the rights of unmarried cohabitants. See text at notes 71-74 and
79-85 infra. The Marvin court noted that "the past decisions hover ever the issue in the
somewhat. wispy form of the figures of a Chagall painting ...." 18 Cal. 3d at 670, 557
P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. al 822. The Marvin decision presented the California Su-
preme Court with an opportunity to formulate a clear standard and to resolve conflicts
in several recent California court of appeal decisions. Two of these decisions, In re
Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973), and Estate of
Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rpt.r. 41 (1975), held that the Family Law Act,
CAL. Civ. Cone §§ 4000-5138 (West 197(? 8c.1980 Supp.), governs the rights of unmar-
ried cohabitants at the termination of their relationship, while another, Beckman v.
Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975), rejected that holding. 18 Cal.
3d at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rpt.r. at 819.
"" 18 Cal. 3d at 667-68, 557 P.2c1 at I I I, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
7" Id. at 668, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rpt.r. at 821.
'' See, e.g., Shaw v. Shaw, 227 Cal. App. 2d 159, 164, 38 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523
(1964) (dictum); Garcia r. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 361, 368, 235 P.2d 89, 92 (1951)
(dictum).
72 See, e.g., Filli v. Estate of Westbrook, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 460, 247 P.2d 19, 20
(1952); Barlow v. Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2c1 274, 277, 333 P.2c1 64, 66 (1958) (dictum);
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not be enforced." In light of this contention, the supreme court surveyed
California precedent and determined that agreements in fact had not been
held invalid if they were involved in or contemplated sexual relations. 74 In-
stead, recovery had been denied only where the agreement. rested upon a
consideration of meretricious sexual services. 75 Relying on these decisions,
the supreme court formulated the standard that adults who live together and
engage in sexual relations are fully competent to negotiate an agreement re-
specting their property rights, to the extent that the contract is not made in
consideration for sexual services. 78 The Marvin court concluded that, because
the terms of the contract as alleged by the plaintiff did not rest upon such
unlawful consideration, the trial court's judgment for the defendant must be
reversed. 77
Having thus determined the validity of express agreements between un-
married cohabitants, the majority considered other bases upon which courts
could grant recovery in such situations. 7 ' The court focused on theories of
implied contract and equitable relief, examining the treatment of the claims of
unmarried cohabitants in former California Court of Appeal" and Supreme
Court." decisions," The court found that these cases "exhibited a schizo-
phrenic inconsistency" in their treatment of claims of nonmarital partners. 82
Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2c1 359, 362, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (1954) (dictum); Hill v.
Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 602, 213 P.2d 727, 729 (1950).
73 18 Cal. 3d at 668, 557 P.2d. at 112, 134 Cal. Rpt.r. at 821.
" Id. at 670, 557 P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
73 Id. at 670-71, 557 P.2cl at 113, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr, at 825.
77 Id. at 675, 557 P.2d at 116, 134	 Rptr. at 825. The defendant had
offered several other justifications fin. the trial court's judgment in his favor. These
arguments involved the proper interpretation of California statutes. Each of these ar-
guments was rejected by the supreme court. For a discussion of these claims, see 18
Cal. 3d at 668 n.4, 672-74, 557 P.2d at 112 n.4, 115-16, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821 n.4,
824-23.
78 Id. at 675, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. Although the court's
decision concerning the issue of express agreements mandated reversal of the trial
court's judgment, both parties had briefed the issue of recovery in the absence of such
an agreement. Because the supreme court held that the plaintiff might amend her
complaint to state a cause of action in implied contract or in equity, the court took this
opportunity to resolve inconsistencies in former decisions concerning relief in these
areas and to guide the parties on retrial. Id.
7 " See, e.g., Weak v. Weak, 202 Cal. App. 2c1 632, 638-39, 21 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13
(1962) (equity will protect interests of' unmarried cohabitants who agree to pool earn-
ings and share equally in joint accumulations): Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal.
App. 2d 708, 719, 200 P.2d 49, 56 (1948) (in absence of express agreement, unmar-
ried cohabitant is not entitled to recover value of services): Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal,
App. 2d 188, 192, 185 1'.2d 848. 850 (1947) (in absence of express agreement, unmar-
ried cohabitant is not entitled to recover value of services).
4 " See Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 662-64, 371 P.2d 329, 331-33, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 593, 595-97 (1962) (rendition of services does not form the basis for equitable
division of property): Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943)
(cohabitant is entitled to equitable division of property in. proportion to the value of
funds contributed toward its acquisition).
"l 18 Cal. 3d at. 675-79, 357 P.2d at 116-19, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825-28.
82 18 Cal. 3d at 678, 557 P.2d at 118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
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The Marvin court noted that, in prior decisions, the California courts had
upheld express agreements between unmarried cohabitants, thus applying
common law contract principles, but had denied relief in implied contract,
thus ignoring the common law principle that implied contracts can arise from
the conduct of the parties." Additionally, the Marvin court found an incon-
sistency in the courts' disposition of property accumulated through joint ef-
fort. It observed that, while the courts had held that a party would be entitled
to a share of property when he had contributed funds or property toward its
acquisition," they had refused to recognize an interest in property based on
one party's contributions of services."' The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that this refusal to permit unmarried cohabitants to assert rights based
upon accepted principles of implied contract or equity had resulted in an
unfair* distribution of property.'" Examining the reasons traditionally ad-
vanced to justify denial of relief, the court determined that none had merit." 7
First, the supreme court indicated that the most common basis for denial
of recovery had been the assertion that lelquitable considerations arising
from the reasonable expectations of benefits attending the status of mar-
riage ... arc not present [in a nonmarital relationship]." 88 While the Marvin
court agreed that parties to a nonmarital cohabitation cannot have based any
expectations on the belief that they are married, it recognized that "other
expectations and equitable considerations remain." 8"
 The court reasoned
that the parties might expect that property would be divided according to
their own tacit understanding, and that, in the absence of such understand-
ing, the courts might fairly apportion property accumulated through mutual
effort."
The court. implied that recovery in former cases had also been denied
because of a presumption that the services of unmarried cohabitants are con-
tributed as a gift, and therefore have no value as consideration for an implied
agreement or as a basis for equitable distribution of property.'" The Marvin
court rejected this presumption, stating that "Where is no more reason to
presume that services are cOntributed as a gift. than to presume that funds are
contributed as a gift." " 2
 The majority determined that a better approach
"
" Id. at 679, 557 P.2d at 11[[, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
"' Id.
8" Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
$ 7 Id. The court first noted that denial of recovery had not been, and could
not be, justified by any theory of punishing a -guilty- partner: "Indeed, to the extent
that denial of relief 'punishes' one partner, it necessarily rewards the other by permit-
ting hint to retain a disproportionate amount of the property. - hi.
" hl. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830, quoting Valiera v. Vallera,
21 Cal. 2d at 685, 134 l'.2d at 763.
10
 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at. 830.
yin
"' hl. at 683, 557 1).2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. See, e.g., Keene v. Keene,
57 Cal. 2d 657, 668, 371 P.2d 329. 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 600 (in case of nonmarital
cohabitation, strong implication that services are intended by one performing them as
gifts).
92
 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 l'.2d'at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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would be to presume "that the parties intended to deal fairly with one
another." "3
The Marvin court also rejected a final argument which traditionally had
been advanced to deny recovery—that granting remedies to unmarried
cohabitants would discourage marriage. While recognizing the well-established
public policy to foster and promote the institution of marriage, the court held
that "perpetuation of judicial rules which result in an inequitable distribution
of property accumulated during a nonmarital relationship is neither a just nor
an effective way of carrying out that policy." "4 Furthermore, the court took
judicial notice of the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern soci-
ety," and found that it would not be realistic to deny recovery on the basis of
"alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned
by so many,"""
Having thus dispensed with the arguments formerly advanced to deny
extracontractual recovery, the Marvin court concluded that, in the absence of
an express agreement, courts should apply remedies designed to protect the
reasonable and lawful expectations of the parties to a nonmarital cohabita-
tion."' First, the majority proposed that a court might inquire into the con-
duct of the parties to determine whether an implied contract or implied
agreement of partnership or joint venture was indicated. 98 Second, the court
sanctioned recovery under principles of resulting or constructive trust when
appropriate. 99 Finally, the court determined that a party to a nonmarital
cohabitation might recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of ser-
vices rendered, less the reasonable value of support received, if that party
could show that services were rendered with the expectation of monetary
award.'" The court did not elaborate on these theories of recovery, but
rather advanced them by way of illustration, adding in a footnote that courts
might fashion "additional equitable remedies to protect the expectations of
the patties" when warranted by the facts of the particular case."' Having
made these suggestions to guide the trial court, the California Supreme Court
remanded the Marvin case for further proceedings.
Justice Clark dissented in part from the majority opinion. While concur-
ring with the decision of the majority to permit recovery in express or implied
contract, justice Clark criticized its provision for quantum .meruit and equitable
"3 Id., quoting Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d at 674, 371 P.2d at 339, 21 Cal.
Rptr. at 603 (dissenting opinion).
" 4 Id., 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cat. Rptr. at 831. The supreme court indicated
that denial of relief would not he an effective method of encouraging parties to marry
because the party in whose name property is held might in fact prefer not to marry in
order to thus retain all the benefits. Id. For further discussion of the argument that
allowing recovery for unmarried cohabitants would discourage marriage, see text at
notes 229-35 infra.
Id., 557 P.2c1 at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.




"" Id., 557 P.2d at 122-123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
1 " Id. at 684 n.25, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25.
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recovery." He found the discussion of these theories of recovery to be un-
necessary in the instant. case, because the resolution of the contract issue alone
required reversal of the trial court judgment.t 03
 He also criticized the majori-
ty's failure "to advise us of the circumstances permitting recovery, limitations
on recovery, or whether their numerous remedies are cumulative or exclu-
sive." 104 Moreover, he reasoned that the "general sweep" of the majority
opinion raised but failed to answer questions in several areas.
First., justice Clark questioned whether the allowance for recovery in the
absence of agreement tnight violate legislative intent."' Specifically, he ex-
pressed doubt that what he termed the "equal division rule" of' the majority
opinion could he reconciled with the legislature's exclusion of "some parties to
a meretricious relationship" from the statute providing for equal division of
marital property at the termination of a marriage.'" In addition, he indi-
I " 2 Id. at. 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Justice Ciark used the
term "implied in fact agreement." It seems clear that this is the type of agreement to
which the majority was referring when it used the term "implied contract." The major-
ity clearly stated that such agreements would be implied from the conduct of the par-
ties. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831, In a footnote, the majority also
stated that. "in a sense all contracts made in fact, as distinguished from quasi-
contractual obligations, are express contracts, differing only in the manner in which
the assent of the parties is expressed and proved." Id. at 678 n.16, 557 P.2d at 118
n.16. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 827 n.16.
103
 id. at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Justice Clark reasoned
that "[t]his court should not attempt to determine all anticipated rights, duties and
remedies within every meretricious relationship—particularly in vague terms. Rather,
these complex issues should be determined as each arises in a concrete case." Id.
04 Id. Justice Clark envisioned the possibility that "tinder the majority opinion
a party may recover half of the property acquired during the relationship on the basis
of general equitable principles, recover a bonus based on specific equitable considera-
tions, and recover a second bonus in quantum meruit." Id.
'" Id. at 686, 557 P.2d at 124, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
1 "" Id. at. 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 832. CAL. CIV. Corr; § 4452
(West Sttpp. 1980) provides:
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and
the court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that
the marriage was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have
the status of a putative spouse, and, if the division of property is in issue,
shall divide, in accordance with Section 4800, that property acquired dur-
ing the union which would have been community property or quasi-
community properly if the union had not been void or voidable. Such
property shall be termed "quasi-marital properly". If Ihe court expressly
reserves jurisdiction, it may make the property division at a time sub-
sequent to the judgment.
Id. Thus, putative spouses are entitled to equal division of community property, as are
lawful spouses. No mention, however, is made of unmarried cohabitants who, like the
Nfarvins, are well aware that they are not legally married. Therefore, justice Clark was
correct in his assertion that such couples had been excluded from the legislature's
equal division rule. Nevertheless, his contention that the majority had created judicially
an "equal division rule" fin- unmarried cohabitants seems inaccurate. In fact, the
majority had stated emphatically that its decision did not "extend to plaintiff the rights
which the [civil code] grants valid or putative spouses: we hold only that she has the
same rights to enforce contracts and to assert her equitable interest in property ac-
quired through her effort as does any other unmarried person. - 18 Cal, 3d at 684
n.24. 557 P.2d at 122 11.29, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
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cated that the application of equitable principles and its attendant. examina-
tion of the conduct of the parties might violate the spirit. of the statute provid-
ing for "no-fault" divorce."'
Justice Clark also expressed concern that recovery in the absence of
agreement might in fact contravene the intentions of the parties rather than
further them."' He reasoned that parties to a nonmarital relationship might
have chosen not to marry in order to avoid financial obligations. 10 "
Moreover, he questioned whether allowance of quantum meruit recovery might
place unmarried cohabitants in a better position than lawful spouses)"
Finally, justice Clark expressed his concern that the allowance of ex-
tracontractual recovery would generate "undue burdens" on trial courts."'
He mentioned two potential problems. The first is the difficulty in ascertain-
ing the value of services rendered and benefits received where quantum meruit
relief is requested." 2 The second is what he termed the "unmanageable
burden of arbitrating domestic disputes -
 where equitable principles are
employed.' '
C. Conflicts Between Hewitt and Marvin
An examination of the reasoning in the preceding opinions reveals that
the Hewitt decision is in several respects directly at. odds with the majority
opinion in Marvin. The Illinois Supreme Court was unwilling to accept the
Marvin majority's holding that an express contract. between unmarried
cohabitants is enforceable to the extent that it does not rest upon a considera-
tion of sexual services."' Of course, the Hewitt court was uncle[' no obligation
to accept. the reasoning of the supreme court of another state, particularly in
light of the fact. that the Marvin decision was "facilitated by California prece-
dent." 115 The Illinois court was aware of the argument advanced in Marvin
that refusal to grant recovery might lead to unfair results as between the par-
ties,'" but indicated that such a consideration is secondary to public policy
'"' 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 1 1 .2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
CAL. CR'. Curer. § 4509 (West Stipp. 1980) provides:
In any pleadings or proceedings for legal separation or dissolution of mar-
riage under this part. including depositions and discovery proceedings, evi-
dence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible, except
where child custody is in issue and such evidence is relevant to that issue.
Id. (emphasis added).
S 0" 18	 3d at 686, 557 P.2d at 124, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
111 " Id. at 085-86, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
"" Icl. al. 686, 557 1).2t1 at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Lawful spouses in
California cannot receive recovery in quantum meruit. Sanguinetti v. Satiguinetti, 9 Cal.
2d 95, 100. 09 l'.2d 845. 847 (1937). Presumably, this rule is what. justice Clark was
referring to when he expressed his concern that unmarried cohabitants would be in a
better position than lawful spouses. For discussion of this statement, see text at notes
258-61 infra.
"' 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 P.2d at 124, 134 Cal. Rim - . at 833.
112 Id., 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rpt.r. at 832.
113 Id.
" 4 77 111. 2d at 5460, 394 N.E.2d at •1208-09.
115 Id. at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
u" Id. at 57-58. 394 N.E.2d at 1207.
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issues." 7 The Hewitt court's primary concern was that allowance of recovery
would in effect amount to reinstatement of common law marriage and would
weaken the marital relationship. 18 The Marvin majority, by contrast, refused
to equate recovery with common law marriage or to find that the importance
of marriage would be diminished."" Rather, that court merely held that un-
married cohabitants should have the same rights before the law as any other
unmarried persons.'" The essential difference between the Hewitt and Mar-
vin decisions seems to be that the California court found it necessary merely
to grant legal status to the claims of nonmarital partners, while the Illinois
court framed the issue of recovery as one requiring the grant of legal status to
the extralegal relationship itself.
Some of Justice Clark's criticisms of the Marvin majority opinion echo the
concerns of the Hewitt court. As was the Hewitt court, he was concerned that.
recovery for unmarried cohabitants might violate legislative intent. Both he
and the Illinois court were troubled by their respective legislatures' exclusion
of nonmarital partners from the statutes governing property distribution at
the termination of marriage. Moreover, Justice Clark's determination that the
majority had created an "equal division rule" and that recovery for nonmarital
partners might contravene the parties' intentions by imposing marriage-like
financial obligations indicates that he may have viewed recovery at least in
part as a grant of legal status to the nonmarital relationship itself."' The
opinion of the superior court which considered the Marvin action on remand
provides an opportunity to test the validity of justice Clark's criticisms, and to
examine the practical application of the theories underlying the Marvin major-
ity opinion.
II. MARVIN v. MARVIN ON REMAND:
THE SUPERIOR COURT'S
REASONING AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
When the Marvin case was considered on remand by the superior court.
of Los Angeles County in April of 1979," 2
 the principles enunciated in the
supreme court's majority opinion were put to a practical test. Following the
decision, the plaintiff amended her complaint to reflect the remedies
suggested by the supreme court.'" Her three causes of action alleged ex-
press and implied contract and equitable bases for relief.' 24
17 Id. at 38, 394 N.E.2d at 1207.
L" See text at notes 37 and 48-60 supra.
"" 18 Cal. 3d at 683-84, 684 n.24, 557 1'.2d at 122. 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
831. 831 n.24.
"" hl. at 684 n.24. 557 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
"I Of course, unlike the Hewitt court, Justice Clark did sanction recovery in
express or implied contract. See text at note 102 supra.
122 Marvin v. Marvin, 11979] 5 FAM. F. Rio'. 3077 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 17,
1979).
121 hi .
124 Irl, The fourth and fifth causes of action, based on qualibint meruit, had not
been pursued by the plaintiff at trial. Id.
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The superior court, however, was unable to find an express contract
under which the plaintiff would be entitled to relief. 125 The court also de-
termined that the conduct of the parties did not give rise to an implied con-
tract to share property and earnings.' 26 The superior court found the
specific equitable remedies of resulting and constructive trust suggested by the
California Supreme Court'" to be unsupported by the evidence.'"
Moreover, the court was unable to find mutual effort in the accumulation of
property which would warrant its division.'" Despite these findings, the
superior court held that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief in the
form of a rehabilitative award of $ 104,000. 13° The court based its determina-
tion on instructions found in a footnote in the supreme court's majority opin-
ion which authorized courts to fashion "additional equitable remedies to pro-
tect. the expectations of the parties ... in cases in which existing remedies
prove inadequate." ' 3 '
A. Rejection of Suggested Contractual Remedies
The superior court made no specific findings of fact; rather, it sum-
marized the testimony of the plaintiff and the delendant.' 32 The facts which
the court found persuasive were included in its discussion of the theories of
recovery advanced by the plaintiff.
First, the superior court found that the parties had not negotiated an
express contract concerning division of property or support payments. The
plaintiff based her contract claim on two promises allegedly made by the de-
fendant. The first, promise was that whatever property the defendant pos-
sessed would belong to the plaintiff as well.'" The second was that the de-
fendant would always "take care of" the plaintiff.' 34 After examining these
statements in light. of the circumstances surrounding them, the court was un-
able to conclude that they evidenced mutual consent to a property-sharing or
support agreement. The court determined that both statements failed to ex-
press clear intent on the part of the defendant to share his property with the
plantiff,' 35 and that she would have been unreasonable in so interpreting
them.' 36
125 Id. at 3081-82.
126 Id. at 3082-83.
127 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rprr. at 831.
128 5 FA M. L. REP. at 3084.
129 Id. at 3084-85.
139
 Id. at 3085. See note 18 supra for an explanation of how this figure was
reached.
1(1. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684 11.25, 557 P.2d at 123 11.25, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 832 n.25.
132 5 FA M. L. RIIP. at 3077-81.
' 33 Id. at 3081.
134 Id. at 3082.
' 35 Id. at 3081. 3082.
' 3" Id. The court considered evidence that the defendant often had expressed
his antagonism toward marriage in general and the property rights automatically ac-
quired by a wife in particular. Id. light of this antagonism, the court reasoned, the
defendant could not have intended to promise the plaintiff a share of his property
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Moreover, the court determined that the plaintiff had not made an enforce-
able promise in return for the defendant's second "promise." 137
Having found no express contract upon which to grant relief, the
superior court next proceeded to examine the conduct of the parties to de-
termine whether an implied contract was demonstrated. The superior court
emphasized that an implied agreement, like an express agreement, must be
founded upon mutual consent.' 38
 Reviewing the evidence of the personal,
social and financial conduct of the parties, the court was unable to infer the
requisite consent.'"
First, the financial arrangements of the parties did not indicate the exis-
tence of an implied contract to share property or earnings. Title to all real
property acquired by the defendant during the relationship was placed solely
in his name.' 40 He kept his funds separate from those of the plaintiff, except
on several isolated occasions. '41 The parties filed separate tax returns, 142 and
the plaintiff placed all the income she acquired during the relationship in a
separate bank account.'" Second, the court observed that the personal and
social conduct. of the parties did not indicate mutual consent to contract.
Neither the fact. that the plaintiff was occasionally introduced as Michelle
Marvin, nor the fact that the parties had registered at hotels as Mr. and Mrs.
Marvin, was fc.iund to manifest a tacit property-sharing agreement.'"
Moreover, the trial court determined that some of the plaintiff's statement
and actions specifically contraindicated the existence of an implied contract.
For example, the court noted that the plaintiff had made a statement to the
effect that she was always very proud of the fact that "nothing really held"
her and the defendant. in their relationship.' 45
 In addition, the court deter-
mined that the plaintiff's original motivation in bringing suit was to enforce
an express agreement that the defendant would make monthly payments to
the plaintiff fin' a five-year period.]"'' The court implied that the plaintiff's
similar to that to which a wife would be entitled, Id. It concluded that, because the
plaintiff was aware of the defendant's attitude, she could not reasonably have expected
such an entitlement. Id.
137 Id. at 3082. In determining that the plaintiff had not made an enforceable
promise, the court noted: "Even if, argueado, she had promised to 'forego her career,
defendant could riot have legally enforced such promise." Id.
Id. at 3083.
139 Id,
140 Id. at 3082.
141
 Id. at 3082, 3083. 'the parties maintained joint bank accounts while living
together outside of Los Angeles when the defendant was filming motionpictures "on
location." Id. at 3079, 3080. The court found that these isolated instances did not
indicate that the parties intended to share the funds, which were always transferred to
the defendant's separate account in Los Angeles when the parties returned. Id. al.
3083.
142 Id. at 3082.
143 Id,
144 Id, at 3083.
1 ' Id. at 3082. The statement was made in an interview recorded in an article
introduced into evidence at the trial. Id.
146 Id. Although the defendant had at one point made monthly payments to
the plaintiff, such payments had been discontinued. hi. at 3080.
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original pursuit of that channel of recovery indicated that she did not expect
a share of the defendant's property.H 7
The court further determined that, while the plaintiff had proved that
she performed household services for the defendant, she had not proved that
these services were performed in consideration for a property agreement.'"
Although the court recognized that household services may he valuable con-
sideration, it stated that such services are often performed gratuitously.'"
Because the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of an implied agree-
ment, the court held that she was unable to claim that the services she had
performed were in consideration for such an agreement.'"
In conclusion, the court, stated that the relationship of the parties was
based on mutual affection, and not on mutual consent to contract. 15 ' Having
thus found no basis for recovery in implied contract, the court went on to
consider the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief.
B. Rejection of the Plaintiff's Equitable Arguments
The court first considered the plaintiff's claim that she was entitled to a
share of the defendant's property on the basis of a resulting trust. The court.
pointed out that, in order for a resulting trust to be estahished, it must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended the prop-
erty to be held by one party in trust for the other, and that consideration to
purchase the property was provided by the party not holding tide.'" The
court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that she had provided such
consideration. 153 The court recognized that the plaintiff might contend that.
her furnishing household services for the defendant relieved him of the ex-
pense of obtaining them from a third party, and thereby enhanced his finan-
cial status and his ability to purchase property*" Nevertheless, the court
147 Id. at 3082. The superior court also found that the plaintiff's pursuit of it
claim for compensation front the producer of a film in which Lee Marvin had ap-
peared was evidence that no agreement was contemplated by the parties. The court
noted:
The very fact that plaintiff pursued a claim [against the producer] makes it
plain that she expected III) part of any earnings of defendant from the
picture. Otherwise, why would she commence a lawsuit to recover a find-
er's fee or half of a producer's fee when she would have rights to half of
the million dollars paid to defendant for the picture?
Id. The superior court's reasoning on this point is unclear. In the suit against the
producer, the plaintiff apparently was attempting to obtain compensation for her own
effOrts. Such a claim does not seem inconsistent with an expectation that she would
receive a portion of the defendant's earnings as well. Rather, if the parties had in-
tended to share equally in acquisitions, the defendant would be entitled to half of her
earnings just as she would be to his.
I" Id. at 3083.
149 Id.
' 5" Id. In addition, the court determined that the evidence did not support the
plaintiff's contention that she had given up her career as consideration for an implied
agreement. hi. at 3082.
151 Id. at 3083.
1 " Id. at 3089.
1:,a
' 5 ' Id., citing Bruch„rupra note 32, at 123.
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determined that any such enhancement was offset by the flow of economic
benefits from the defendant. to the plaintiff.' 55
The court next considered the plaintiff's claim that she was entitled to a
share of the property by virtue of a constructive trust. The court noted that
this remedy is imposed to force restitution of something that in fairness and
good conscience does not belong to the party in possession.''" The court
concluded that all property accumulated by the defendant during his relation-
ship with the plaintiff was obtained through his own efforts, reputation and
skill and that it could not be said that such property did not in good con-
science belong to him.'" The superior court also noted that a constructive trust
may be imposed where property is obtained through fraudulent misrepresen-
tation or by some other wrongful act.'" The court, however, found no evi-
dence of such wrongdoing by the defendant.'"
The plaintiff's final claim derived from the California Supreme Court's
suggestion in Marvin that a court might "fairly apportion property accumu-
lated through mutual effort.- loo
 She contended that her work as
homemaker, cook and companion constituted "mutual effort." ' " ' In light of
this contention, the superior court examined the conduct of the parties in two
cases it. understood the supreme court to have cited as "examples of mutual
effort.," "2
 In re Marriage of Cary'"" and Estate qf Atherley." 4 In Cary, the par-
ties had purchased a home and other property, obtained credit, borrowed
money and filed joint income tax returns.":' The parties in Atherley had
pooled their earnings and used the pooled funds to purchase land and mate-
rials for improvements on the land."" Both parties had worked on the im-
provements and they held a promissory note received on the sale of a parcel
in joint tenancy." 7
Contrasting the facts of Cary and Atherley with those in the instant action,
the superior court concluded that the women in the former cases had shown
"considerably more involvement. ... in the accumulation of property" than
had the plai ntiff.' 68
 The court noted that, in Marvin, all assets were pur-
chased solely with the defendant's earnings, and funds were kept in separate
accounts.'" Finding that it could not "deem the singing career of [the] plain-
I" FAN/. L. REP. at 3084. Such benefits included fur coats, a Mercedes Benz,





"" 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 1).2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rini - . at 830.
5 FAm. L. REP. at 3089.
1112 Id.
1"
 34 Cal. App. 3d 345. 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
I" 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
" 5
 34 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
'"" 44 Cal. App. 3d at 761-63, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43.
117 Id. at 762, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
1 "' 5 FA M. L. REP. at 3084.
1 "" Id. at 3085.
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tiff to be the 'mutual effort' required by the supreme court," 10 the trial court
reasoned that the plaintiff's only contribution to the requisite mutual effort
was her furnishing household services and companionship.' 7 ' Citing the so-
cial and financial benefits flowing from the defendant to the plaintiff, the
court determined that any such contributions "would appear to have been
compensated."' 72
The superior court's denial of the mutual effort argument left most of
the remedies suggested by the supreme court unavailable to the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, despite the failure of the trial court to find facts sufficient to
establish an express or implied contract or to impose a trust on the defen-
dant's property, the court fashioned a remedy for the plaintiff. Quoting from
the footnote to the majority opinion of the supreme court which authorized
lower courts to fashion "additional equitable remedies to protect the expecta-
tions of the parties ... [where] existing remedies prove inadequate," 173 the
trial court awarded the plaintiff $104,000 "for rehabilitation purposes. " 179
This equtable award, granted with scant discussion, indicates that the superior
court misinterpreted the supreme-court's majority opinion. In addition, the
award serves to illustrate the validity of some of Justice Clark's criticisms.
C. The Shortcomings of the Court's Equitable Award
The superior court_ offered few justifications for its rehabilitative award
to the plaintiff, simply stating that it. was exercising its inherent equitable
powers.'" The court took notice of the plaintiff's "recent resort ... to un-
employment insurance benefits to support herself and ... the fact that a re-
turn of [the] plaintiff to a career as a singer is doubtful."'" Further, the
court indicated its awareness that. "the market value of [the] defendant's
property at [the] time of separation exceeded $1,000,000." 177 In conclusion,
the superior court expressed its intention that the monetary award should be
used to re-educate the plaintiff, so that she might learn employable skills and
"return from her status as companion of a motion picture star to a separate,
independent but perhaps more prosaic existence."'"
It is difficult. to reconcile the superior court's equitable award with the
instructions of the California Supreme Court upon which it was based. The
supreme court had indeed authorized lower courts to fashion additional
equitable remedies where indicated by the circumstances.'" The majority,
' 71 14. The court noted that the plaintiff's net earnings from her singing career
had gone into her separate account. and that the defendant had in fact expended
funds to further her career. Id.
171 Id.
172 id .
172 See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684 n.25, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25, 134
Cal. Rptr. at 832 0.25.





"" 18 Cal. 3d at 684 11.25, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25.
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however, had attached the condition that such equitable remedies should
"protect the expectations of the parties."'" The superior court cited the
footnote containing these instructions before granting the plaintiff her re-
habilitative award."' Yet, in contradiction, the superior court earlier stated
at length, in its discussion of the plaintiff's claims under express and implied
contract, that neither the words nor the conduct of the defendant reasonably
would have promoted expectations of proprietary benefits on the part of the
plaintiff.'" In fact, the court determined that the plaintiff had received fi-
nancial benefits from the defendant which offset any benefits she had pro-
vided him through her furnishing of companionship and household ser-
vices.'" Further, the court reasoned that the defendant's words and conduct
indicated that he was unwilling to undertake the responsibility of caring fi-
nancially for the plaintiff when the relationship had ended.'" In light of
these findings, the superior court's equitable award to the plaintiff can hardly
be said to have been based on the parties' expectations.'"
The superior court opinion suggests that the basis for the equitable relief
awarded was the financial need of the plaintiff and the defendant's ability to
meet her needs because of his financial position.'" The supreme court opin-
ion, however, nowhere states that one party's financial needs and the other's
financial capabilities will in themselves justify the award of an equitable rem-
edy. Rather, the supreme court. continually emphasized that recovery should
be premised upon what trial courts determine to be the parties' reasonable
and lawful expectations. 1 A 7 Having found that the relationship in the Marvin
case gave rise to no reasonable expectations on the part of the plaintiff that
the defendant would provide for her financial needs, the superior court
should not have strained to supply a remedy.
The remedy fashioned by the superior court not only contravenes the
instructions provided in the supreme court majority opinion, but also illus-
trates several of the concerns expressed by Justice Clark in his dissent. First,
Justice Clark had expressed concern that recovery in the absence of agree-
ment might "contravene the intention of the parties."'" As noted above,""
the superior court was unable to find that the defendant intended to support.
the plaintiff after their relationship had terminated. Thus, the superior court
remedy contravened the intention of at least one of the parties to the Marvin
action.
Justice Clark also had questioned whether it is "equitable to impose the
economic obligations of lawful spouses on [unmarried cohabitants] when the
14 " Id.
' SI 5 Frost. L. REP, at 3085.
L82 Id. at 3081-83.
"" Id. at 3083-85.
" 4
 Id. at 3081-82.
185
 Lee Marvin is appealing the superior court judgment, claiming that the
equitable award cannot he reconciled with the court's determination that there was no
contractual relationship between the parties. 5 FAN]. I.. REP. 2962 (Oct. 16, 1979).
18" 5 FAM. L. REP. at 3085.
1 " 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 l'.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
"8 /d. at 686, 557 P.2d at 124. 134 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
"9
 Sec text accompanying note 184 supra.
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latter may have rejected matrimony to avoid such obligations." "" The simi-
larity between the superior court award and the recovery often awarded to
lawful spouses Cannot be overlooked. Upon granting a divorce decree, a court
may award "rehabilitative alimony" in order to enable the spouse who has
remained at home performing household services to receive an education and
obtain employment."' The superior court expressly stated its intention that
the plaintiff's award should be used for purposes of education and employ-
ment."' In addition, alimony is often calculated according to the financial
needs of one party and the financial capabilities of the other." 3 Such finan-
cial circumstances were considered by the superior court. in its decision."'
Thus, the court seems to have imposed at least some of the economic obliga-
tions of a lawful spouse on the defendant,"'' although it had documented his
desire to avoid marriage and its financial consequences.'"
The superior court might have avoided the realization of justice Clark's
reservations, had it followed the majority's instructions to grant recovery
based on the parties' reasonable expectations. Nevertheless, in addition to
granting recovery that contravened the parties' expectations, the superior
court also seems to have misinterpreted the majority's discussion of the value
of household services.
D. The Court's Reluctance to Value Household Services
The majority opinion had been explicit in recognizing that household
services have value."' The California Supreme Court had criticized former
decisions which refused to recognize an interest in property based upon the
contribution of services,'" and in particular had criticized the presumption
that services are contributed as a gift.'" Yet the superior court seemed re-
luctant to depart from the presumption that services are contributed gratui-
tously, or to recognize that services may form a basis for an interest in prop-
erty.
"" 18 Cal. 3d at 685-86, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
" 1 See, e.g„ Brown V. Brown, 300 So. 2c1 719, 724 (Fla. 1974): Dakin v. Dakin,
62 Wash. 2d 687, 692, 384 P.2d 639, 642-43 (1963) (wife awarded temporary alimony
for support until she became employed and self-sufficient).
142
 5 FAM. L. REP. at 3085.
193 See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 300 So, 2c1 719, 725 (Fla. 1974) (summarizing
present alimony law as providing that alimony will be based on needs of recipient and
financial capabilities of contributing spouse): Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2c1 825,
830 (Fla. 1971) (court listed wife's Financial needs, her employment ability, the capacity
of the husband to meet the needs of the wife and children, as factors to consider in
determining whether to award alimony); In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339,
346-48 (Iowa 1972) (needs and financial capacity of both spouses considered).
"4 5 FAM. L. REP. at 3085.
"5 The defendant was not, however, required to divide his property equally
with the plaintiff, as would a lawful spouse under CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West
Stipp. 1980).
19" 5 FAM. L REP. at 3082.
19  See 18 Cal. 3d at 670 11.5, 557 1'.2d at 113 n.5, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 822 n.5.
"8 Id. at 679, 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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First., in its discussion of the plaintiff's claim of implied contract, the
superior court. stated that household services "may be rendered out of love or
affection and are indeed so rendered in a myriad of relationships between
man and woman which are not contractual in nature." 2"" Remarking that
the plaintiff had failed to prove the other elements of a contract, the court.
refused to accept the proof of her furnishing household services as considera-
tion for an implied contract. 2 " While the result reached by the superior
court seems to be warranted by the evidence, the court's reasoning implies
that, absent other proof of contract, services are presumed to be gratuitous. A
better approach for the superior court might have been to hold that the fur-
nishing of household services by the plaintiff was evidence supporting the
existence of an implied agreement. The court then could have examined the
other conduct of the parties to determine whether the evidence of implied
agreement had been rebutted. Thus, the superior court could have reached
the same result without contradicting the supreme court's finding that services
should not be presumed to be a gift.
In its discussion of the plaintiff's "mutual effort" argument, the superior
court also appears to have misinterpreted the majority opinion. The superior
court's interpretation of "mutual effort" was based on an examination of the
fact patterns of two court of appeal decisions which it said had been cited by
the supreme court as examples of mutual effort, In re Marriage of Cary 202 and
Estate of Atherley."3 The Cary and Atherley decisions, however, had not been
cited specifically in the supreme court opinion as examples of mutual effort.
Each of these decisions held that unmarried cohabitants are entitled to divi-
sion of community property acquired during an "actual family relation-
ship." 204 While the Marvin court rejected this reasoning, it expressed agree-
ment with "the perception of [those] courts that the application of former
precedent in the factual setting of those cases would work an unfair distribu-
tion of the property accumulated." 2" The California Supreme Court then
examined the reasoning of' the pre-Cary decisions. 2 " It was during this
examination that the majority suggested that courts might fairly apportion
property accumulated through mutual effort. 207
Considering the facts of Cary and Atherley as illustrative of mutual effort,
the superior court determined that the supreme court "doubtless intended by
the phrase 'mutual effort' to mean the relationship of a man and woman who
have joined together to make a home, who act together to earn and deposit
such earnings in joint accounts, who pay taxes together." 208
 The court
further stated that mutual effort could not be inferred from one party's con-
2"" 5 FAM. L. REP. at 3083.
201 Id.
202 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
2"
 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975).
2"4 In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 867:
Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 769, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
2"0
 18 Cal. 3d at 681, 557 P.2d at 120-21, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829-30.
2" Id. at 682-83, 557 P.2d at 121-22, 134 C:al. Rptr. at 830-31.
2 "' Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
2"8 5 FAM. L. REP. at 3085.
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trihution of "services as homemaker, cook and companion and nothing
else," 2 "" but in addition would require "participation in money-earning ac-
tivities.""a This reasoning is in direct contradiction with that of the California
Supreme Court, which had criticized former decisions precisely because they
had refused to recognize an interest in property based on contribution of
services.211 In fact., the majority had quoted with approval from the dissent-
ing opinion of justice Curtis in Vallera v. Vallera, 212
 in which he pointed out:
Unless it can be argued that a woman's services as cook, house-
keeper, and homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical that if,
when she contributes money to the purchase of property, her in-
terest will be protected, then when she contributes her services in the
home, her interest in property accumulated should be protected. 2 ' 3
Thus, the supreme court opinion had not in fact required the participation in
money-earning activities which the superior court found it to have "doubtless
intended."
The superior court's decision concerning the value of services, as consid- .
eration for an implied agreement or as a contribution toward mutual effort,
may not have been prejudicial to the plaintiff in Marvin, because the value of
her services was far offset by financial benefits flowing to her from the de-
fendant. 214 Nevertheless, it may prove detrimental to plaintiffs in future ac-
tions if courts ruling on the value of services rely on the reasoning of the
superior court rather than on a careful reading of the California Supreme
Court opinion.
In summary, the superior court's interpretation of the supreme court
opinion was flawed in several respects. First, the equitable award did not re-
flect the expectations of the parties. Thus, the supreme court's specific in-
structions were disregarded. In addition, because of this failure to follow the
supreme court's instructions, the superior court decision illustrated some of
the concerns expressed by Justice Clark. Finally, the superior court's interpre-
tation of the majority opinion with regard to the value of household services
violated the spirit of the supreme court's reasoning in Marvin.
Aside from the superior court's misinterpretation of the Marvin majority
opinion and its consequent realization of Justice Clark's criticisms, the court's
equitable award to the plaintiff seemingly adds force to some of the argu-
ments advanced by the Illinois Supreme Court in Hewitt. First, the Illinois
court had expressed concern that recovery in the absence of agreement might
lead to awards based on the fact of cohabitation and subsequent separation
The Marvin superior court's award was not based on any legally-




 18 Cal. 3d at 679, 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
2)2
 21 Cal. 2d 68k, 134 P.2d 761.
2"
 18 Cal. 3d at 679, 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828, quoting Vallera v.
Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d at 686-87, 134 P.2d at 764 (dissenting opinion).
2"
 Sec text at notes 155 and 172 supra.
2•
 77 111. 2d at 56-57, 394 N.1-1.2d at 1207.
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the imposition of any recognized equitable remedy available to unmarried
persons. Thus, the relief does seem to have been awarded merely on the basis
of cohabitation and subsequent separation. In addition, the marital nature of
the award could be viewed by proponents of the Hewitt decision as represent-
ing at least a partial judicial reinstatement of common law marriage. It is
unfortunate that the California Supreme Court's philosophy of recognizing
judically the claims of unmarried cohabitants was transformed by the superior
court into a judicial recognitition of the relationship itself. The superior
court's mutation of the supreme court opinion thus lends credibility to the
arguments of those who oppose recovery for unmarried cohabitants.
The arguments in opposition to recovery for unmarried cohabitants can,
however, be answered. This Note proposes that the answers lie in public pol-
icy considerations which point to allowance of recovery within the limits of
existing legal and equitable theories.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
CLAIMS OF UNMARRIED COHABITANTS
In recent years, the incidence of nonmarital cohabitation in the United
States had increased dramatically. Census figures for 1977 indicate that the
number of couples living together without being legally married increased
eighty-three percent from 1970 to 1977. 216 In all, one million unrelated
couples of opposite sexes were living together. 21 In light of these statistics,
and in view of the wide publicity given the Marvin decisions, 2 " it appears
inevitable that courts will be faced with an ever-increasing number of cases in
which the property rights and financial obligations of unmarried couples will
be at issue. When such issues arise, courts must be prepared to make well-
reasoned decisions which not only resolve the problems of the immediate
litigants but also provide clear guidelines for future rulings on the same is-
sues.
A workable approach to the problem would he the application of ac-
cepted principles of contract law and equity, as proposed by the California
Supreme Court in Marvin. The application of recognized legal theories will
result in consistent. treatment. of the claims of unmarried cohabitants and will
provide guidelines for the litigants and for courts and attorneys as well. First,
courts should enforce express agreements concerning the property or funds
of unmarried cohabitants. Second, in the absence of proof of an express con-
tract, courts should examine the conduct. of the parties to determine whether
"" M. Plotkin, United States Population: Changing Population Patterns, 1979
WoRix) ALmANAc. AND BOOK OF FACTS 21)5, 205.
217 Id.
218 N.V. Times, Dec. 28. 1976, at 12, col. 6: id.. Jan. 2, 1977. § IV, at. 7, cal. 1;
id,. Feb. 12, 1977. at 19, col. 2; id., Jan. 9, 1979, at 14. col. 2; id., Jan. 13, 1979, at 8,
col. 6; id,, Jan. 31, 1979, at 8, col. 5: id.. Feb. 21. 1979, at 12, col. 6: id„ Feb. 22, 1979,
§ III, at 1, col. 5 ., id., Feb. 25, 1979, § IV, at 16, col. 1; id., Mar. 16, 1979, at. 14, col. 6;
id., § II, at 30, col. 1: id., April 19, 1979, at 1, col. 5: id., § 11, am 13, col. I; id., April
20, 1979, at 18, col. 1; id., April 22. 1979, at 35, col. I; id., July 20, 1979, 11, at. 6.
col, 3.
May 1980]	 NONMARITAL CONAI3ITATION	 913
an implied agreement is indicated. Third, courts should apply the principle of
quantum meruit in order to compensate unmarried cohabitants for services
rendered. Finally, courts should apply traditional theories of equitable recov-
ery to unmarried cohabitants.
The application of the preceding theories of recovery will protect the
reasonable expectations of the parties and prevent unjust enrichtnent. 2 " If,
however, the facts of a particular case do not authorize recovery under recog-
nized legal or equitable theories, courts should not strain to provide relief. It
has been demonstrated that the Marvin court's authorization of "additional
equitable remedies""" resulted in a superior court award which contravened
the parties' expectations and resembled in certain respects the relief granted
at termination of a legal marriage. In order to avoid such a result, courts
should take care to grant only that relief which is within the confines of tradi-
tional legal and equitable theories available to unmarried persons. Recovery
should not flow from the fact of cohabitation alone.
As the Hewitt opinion demonstrates, a court may be required to resolve
public policy arguments before it can implement the proposed guidelines set
forth above. It is strongly urged that courts resolve these policy arguments in
favor of allowing recovery for unmarried cohabitants.
Courts in some cases have declared that unmarried cohabitants should be
left in the position in which they are found, as if they were in pari delicto. 22 '
This argument was summarily rejected by the California Supreme Court in its
Marvin decision. As the court reasoned, "to the extent that denial of relief
'punishes' one partner, it necessarily rewards the other by permitting him to
retain a disproportionate amount of the property." 222 Justice Finley of the
Washington Supreme Court expressed a similar view in 1957:
Under such circumstances [claims brought at termination of a non-
marital cohabitation], this court and the courts of other jurisdictions
have, in effect., sometimes said, "We will wash our hands of such
21:1 This list is not intended to he exhaustive; courts might apply other accepted
legal principles warranted by the circumstances of a particular case. For example, un-
married cohabitants holding a deed to property which indicates concurrent ownership
might bring an action to partition the property. See, e.g.. Carlson v. Olson, Minn.
256 N.W.2c1 249. 255 (1977) (plaintiff brought action to partition real and per-
sonal property acquired during the relationship: deed to parties' home listed them as
husband and wife; court found partition statute to be an - appropriate vehicle" for
enforcing what evidence indicated to he the parties' reasonable expectations). But cf.
Beal v. Heal, 282 Or. 115, 121-22, 577 1'.2d 507, 510 (1978) (suit to declare interests of
the parties in real property; land sale contract listed parties as husband and wife: court
found that other evidence must also be considered: "a mechanistic application of [rules
of cotenancy] will not often accurately reflect the expectations of the parties").
22 " 18 Cal. 3d at 685 n.25, 557 P.2d at 123 11.25, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.25.
221 See Oakley v. Oakley, 82 Cal. App. 2d 188, 192, 185 P.2d 848. 850 (1947);
Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 543, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1977); Creasman v. Boyle, 31
Wash. 2d 345, 353, 196 .1).2d 835, 839 (1948): see generally First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Ansel]. 68 Ohio App. 369, 376, 41 N.E.2d 420, 423 (1941)  ("Where parties are in
pail &lido neither can secure affirmative relief at. law or in equity.'').
222 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 1'.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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disputes. The parties should and must be left to their own devices,
just where they find themselves." To me, such pronouncements seem
overly fastidious and a bit fatuous. They are unrealistic and, among
other things, ignore the fact that an unannounced (but nevertheless
effective and binding) rule of law is inherent in any such terminal
statements by a court of law. The unannounced but inherent rule is
simply that the party who has title, or in some instances who is in
possession, will enjoy the rights of ownership of the property con-
cerned. The rule often operates to the great advantage of the cun-
ning and the shrewd, who wind up with possession of the property,
or title to it in their names, at the end of a so-called meretricious
relationship. 223
Thus, when facing arguments that the parties in this type of litigation should
be left where they are found, courts must be aware that such judicial inaction,
rather than representing regard for high moral considerations, might be
viewed as tacit approval of an arrangement that in effect rewards the party
who had the foresight. to place the funds or property in his or her control.
This seems to be the result of the Hewitt litigation. Although Victoria Hewitt's
personal and financial contributions had aided her partner in the successful
pursuit of his career :224 she was precluded from asserting a claim to any of
the property he had accumulated as a result of that success. Thus, Robert
Hewitt in effect was rewarded for his foresight. in avoiding a legal marriage.
Moreover, as Justice Finley pointed out, decisions based on outdated
moral considerations are "unrealistic." 225
 For a variety of reasons, many
people have chosen to live together without undertaking the formalities of a
legal marriage. 22 " As noted above, 227 statistics indicate that nonmarital
cohabitation is a'"fact of life" of modern society. Such statistics in fact proba-
bly underestimate the number of persons living together outside of mar-
riage. 228 A nationwide survey commissioned by Time magazine in 1977 indi-
cated that fifty-two per cent of those interviewed did not view cohabitation as
"morally wrong." 229 Although surveys are inconclusive, the results of the
Time inquiry, along with the statistics cited above, al least point to an increas-
ing tolerance of nonmarital cohabitation in American society. In light of this
222 West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689. 692-93 (1957) (con-
curring opinion).
224 See note and text at note 40 supra.
225 50 Wash. 2c1 at 316, 311 P.2cl at 692.
226 The California Supreme Court in Marvin enumerated several possible
reasons motivating- couples to live together without. marrying. It noted that "many
young couples live together without the solemnization of marriage, in order to make
sure that they can successfully later undertake marriage." 18 Cal. 3d at G83, 557 P.2d
at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The court also reasoned that "kin lower socio-economic
groups the difficulty and expense of dissolving a former marriage often leads couples
to choose a nonmarital relationship." hi. at 675 n.11, 557 P.2d at 117 n. I 1, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 826 n.11.
227 See text at notes 216 and 217 supra.
22 ' See Glendon, Marriage awl the State,. The Withering Away af Marriage, 62 VA.
L. REV. 663, 686 11.98.
224 The New Morality, TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 112, 114,
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tolerance, it would be anachronistic for courts to deny unmarried cohabitants
relief on the basis of "alleged moral considerations that have apparently been
so widely abandoned by so many.- 230
In other jurisdictions, courts have entertained arguments that the strong
public policy to encourage marriage and family life in American society would
be weakened if unmarried persons were allowed to assert financial and other
property rights against their partners. 23 ' Indeed, the Hewitt court reasoned
that allowance of recovery would make cohabitation too attractive an alterna-
tive to marriage.232 Nevertheless, as the California Supreme Court indicated
in Marvin, "Whe argument that granting remedies to the nonmarital partners
'would discourage marriage must fail." 223
First, it cannot he said that likelihood of financial recovery is the only
factor in a couple's decision to live together instead of marrying. Other per-
sonal and social factors may influence the decision. 234 Many couples may not.
even be aware of the financial consequences of their choice. 235 For these
couples, denial of recovery for unmarried cohabitants would not be likely to
encourage or to discourage marriage. They may enter into marriage, and find
at its termination that they have certain financial rights and responsibilites. 23t '
By contrast, they may forego marriage, hut nevertheless expect that their re-
spective contributions to the property they accumulate will be fairly appor-
tioned at termination of the relationship—if not by themselves, then by the
courts. 237 Their personal and financial conduct. may reflect these expecta-
tions. Yet, if courts adopt the rule that unmarried cohabitants will be denied
recovery in all cases, and if one party fails to honor voluntarily his portion of
the agreement, the other may be left with no property or with an amount of
property that does not reflect his expectations or contributions. In such cases,
denial of recovery not only will have failed in its purpose to encourage mar-
riage, but also will have resulted in unfair distribution of property. Such was
the result of the Hewitt decision.
In other cases only one of the parties in the relationship may be aware
that unmarried cohabitants will be denied recovery. It does not necessarily
follow that he or she would choose to marry. In fact, that, party might have
strong motivation to rei'rain from marriage. He could enter into a nonmarital
22 " Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
"' See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 111. 2d at 61-62, 394 N.E.2d at 12011; In re
Marriage of Cary. 34 Cal, App. 3d 345, 353, 109 Ca]. Rptr. 862, 866 (1973) (argument
rejected).
232 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 111. 2d at 61-62, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
2" 18 Cal. 3c1 at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
21-I Sec note 226 supra. In addition, some couples nay wish to marry, but are
unable to enter into a valid marriage. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 2111 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971) (upholding official's refusal to issue marriage license to homosex-
ual couple). appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
23:" See Bruch, supra note 32, at 103.
2" These rights and responsibilities may include division of community prop-
erty, see, e.g., CAL Ctv. Cone § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1980), or alimony or support
payments, see generally cases cited at notes 191 and 1113 supra.
237 See Marvin v. Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d at 682. 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
830; Bruck, supra note 32, at 135.
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relationship, confident that, despite the contribution of funds or services by
the other party, he would not be required to make restitution for the benefits
he acquired at the expense of the other. Thus, in such cases it may be said
that denial of recovery would in effect discourage marriage by allowing the
party who had the foresight to obtain title to the property or possession of the
funds to retain all the benefits. 238
Once a court has determined that recovery for unmarried cohabitants
will not in fact discourage marriage, and that leaving the parties where they
are found may result in unfair distribution of property, application of recog-
nized legal and equitable principles to the claims of unmarried cohabitants
should follow. A logical first step would be for the court to determine'
whether the parties have negotiated an express contract. regarding distribution
of property or funds. If so, the intentions of the parties as expressed in the
agreement should be honored.
In certain cases, however, unmarried cohabitants may have a final hurdle
to overcome before an express agreement. between them will be enforced.
Statutes in some states prescribe criminal penalties for nonmarital cohabita-
tion. 23 " Courts in those states may feel compelled to apply the rule that "[a]
contract to do an illegal act is ... void and unenforceable." 24° Refusal to
enforce the entire contract, however, may not be the only course available to
these courts. Instead, the concept of "divisibility" could be applied. This con-
cept is sometimes used to determine whether a contract. "tainted with illegality
can be severed into a legal and enforceable portion and an illegal and unen-
forceable portion. , 241 Applying this concept to nonmarital cohabitation, the
agreement to cohabit, which is in violation of the statue, could be severed
from the agreement concerning the distribution of property and funds which
the parties have accumulated. 2 " 2 When a contract is divisible, however, a
2" See In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866:
Hewitt v. Hewitt., 92 111. App. 3d at 868-69, 380 N.E.2d at 460.
2" See, e.g., !Lt,. REv.
 . STAT. ch. 38, § 11-8(a) (1977): MASS. GM. LA WS Aux. ch.
272, 19 (West 1970): VA. CODE § 18.2-345 (1975).
4"
 Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 App. Div. 384, 388. 108 N.V.S. 830, 833
(1908). See also Sinnar v. LeRoy, 44 Wash. 2d 728, 731, 270 1'.2d 800. 802 (1954) ("A
court will nut knowingly aid in the furtherance of an illegal transaction, but will leave
the parties where it finds them. '' ).
2." See J. CA LAMAR! 5 J. PERIL1.0, :VHF LA W OF CONTRACTS at 431, § 11-28 (2d
ed. 1977).
242 Cf. Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89. 292 P. 112 (19311) (portion of plumbing
contract calling for payment of services not enforced because plumber was not
licensed, and thus was in violation of statute, while portion providing for payment for
materials was enforced),
The California Courts have been 1k.pplying the divisibility concept to contracts be-
tween unmarried cohabitants since the Trutalli decision. See, e.g., Croslin v. Scott, 154
Cal. App. 2d 767. 316 P.2d 755 (1957): Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270
P.2d 59 (1954). The Marvin supreme court decision indicated that the cases did not
distinguish between "illegal relationships and lawful nonmarital relationships." 18 Cal.
3d at 068 n.4, 557 P.2d at 112 n.4, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821 n.4. See generall'' A. CoRmN,
6A CoxitiN ON (.:ONTRACTS § 1476, at 62'2 (1962) ( - Agreements made by the parties
with respect to money or property are enforceable if they are quite independent of the
illicit relationship:).
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condition to enforcement of the legal portion attaches: the other portion of
the agreement must not be "criminal or immoral in a high degree. "" 13 It
would be unrealistic for courts to apply this condition to block enforcement of
an express contract betWeen unmarried cohabitants, because, as was noted
abov e,244 cohabitation is a common and widely-accepted phenomenon in
American society. Moreover, application of the divisibility concept seems par-
ticularly appropriate for agreements between unmarried cohabitants in light
of the unfair property distribution that may result from leaving the parties
where they are fOund.
In jurisdictions in which courts decide to apply the divisibility concept, as
well as in jurisdictions where statutes do not prohibit cohabitation, express con-
tracts between unmarried cohabitants should be enforced. In the absence of
an express agreement, a court should determine whether the conduct of the
parties indicated an agreement. implied in fact. As Professor Corbin has
explained, such contracts differ from express agreements only in the manner
in which assent is expressed. 24a As he further states, however: "The matter
that is of importance is the degree of effectiveness of the expression used....
IMilhen conduct other than words is such as persons frequently perform with
different meanings, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to decide that an
implied contract exists."""
This distinction between express and implied contracts will be important.
when courts are asked to infer contractual intent from the conduct of unmar-
ried cohabitants. In some cases the parties' conduct may indicate clear intent
to share equally in their acquisitions. Such acts might include the maintenance
of joint bank accounts, the holding of property in joint tenancy or as tenants
in common, or the filing of joint tax returns. 247 In other cases, however,
circumstances may not indicate such clear intent. This may be the case where
the acts of one of the parties are such as may he performed in the absence of
contract. The living arrangement of unmarried cohabitants often resembles
the lifestyle of a traditional married couple, where one party remains in the
home performing household services while the other obtains lucrative
employment."" A court may be reluctant to infer contractual intent from
such a relationship, finding as did the superior court in Marvin that house-
hold services may be rendered out of love or affection ... in a myriad of'
relationships between man and woman which are not contractual in na-
ture. - 24"
24" J. CALAMARI & J . PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at 704, § 22-11.
2(4 See text at notes 216-17 and 227-30 supra.
245 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § I8 (One Vol. Ed., 1952).
24" Id. at 26.
247 See Beal v. Beal. 282 Or. 115. 122, 577 1).2d 507. 510 (1978) ("Woint acts of
a financial nature can give rise to an inference that the parties intended to share
equally." Marvin v. Marvin, 5 FAM . L. REP. at 3083 ("The evidence of' a contract as
to property nay be imputed from a change in the manner of holding, such as joint
tenancy bank accounts
248 S ee, e.I., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 III. 2d 49. 30'1 IN.E.2d 1204 (1970); Carlson v.
Olson,	 Minn.	 256 N.W.2d 240 (1977); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski. 80 N.J. 378.
403 A.2(.1 902 (1070).
2. '" 5 FAm. I.. REP. at 3083.
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Nevertheless, although household services may be performed without
contractual intent in some cases, it would be unwise for a court to adopt a
presumption that they are so performed in the case of unmarried cohabitants.
Such a presumption ignores economic realities. A party who performed the
same services in the market place—as a cook, housekeeper, or maid—would
receive compensation. When the services are performed in the nonmarital
home, the other party is spared the expense of procuring them elsewhere or
the time it would take to perform them himself. In light of the value the
homemaker could have received for the same services performed outside the
home, and in view of the economic benefits conferred on the other party
when such services are rendered in the home, a more logical presumption
would be that the services were rendered with reasonable expectation on the
part of both parties that the party who provided the services would receive
valuable benefits in returnY 5 " Such benefits might include a share in the
property or funds accumulated during the relationship. The nature and ex-
tent of the benefits to be provided pursuant. to this implied agreement would
be determined by the trier of fact as indicated by the circumstances of the
case. 25 '
If the circumstances do not indicate an implied agreement concerning
property or funds, performance of household services might justify applica-
tion of the quasi-contractual remedy of quantum meruit. In order to prevent
unjust enrichment, the law ordinarily will imply a promise to pay reasonable
value when one party has accepted valuable services from another, unless the
circumstances indicate that the services were rendered gratuitously. 252
 In a
domestic setting, courts usually presume that services were rendered gratui-
tously. 25" Thus, an unmarried cohabitant requesting relief in quantum meruit
should be prepared to show that services were performed with expectation of
monetary reward.'" Uncler the principles of quantum meruit, the value of
services rendered by the plaintiff will be offset by the value of the benefits
received from the other party. 255
It may be recalled that Justice Clark disapproved quantum ',lentil recovery
in cases involving unmarried cohabitants. He foresaw difficulty in determining
the value of services rendered and benefits received. 2 "" It would be un-
reasonable, however, for a court to hold that difficulty in evaluation should
preclude recovery under an accepted legal principle. In many cases, especially
"" Furthermore, the party Svh o remains in the home may have foregone op-
portunities to train for and obtain more lucrative employment elsewhere.
2 ' 1 For a sophisticated and insightful discussion of the economic value of
household services. see Bruck, supra note 32, at 110-14.
See, e.g., Jacks v. Sullinger, 284 Ala. 223, 224, 224 So. 2d 583, 584 (1969):
Bush v. Kramer. 185 Neb. I. 3, 173 N.W.2d 367. 369 (1969).
•	 2 " See. e.g., In re Estate of Martin, 261 Iowa 630, 639. 155 N.W.2d 401, 406
(1968); Flertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 469 (1857).
2 ''' So! Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
832; Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 462, 247 P,2(1 19, 21 (1952).
25' So! Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684. 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
832: Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d at 714, 200 P.2d at 53.
2 " Marvin v. Marvin. 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 1'.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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those involving severe personal injury, damages are not easily ascertaina-
ble. 237 Yet plaintiffs in these actions are not barred access to the courts.
Justice Clark also was concerned that recovery in quantum. meruit would
place unmarried cohabitants in "a better position than lawful spouses." 258 Pre-
sumably, he was referring to the California principle that a lawful spouse
cannot recover in quantum meruit. 259 A lawftd spouse in California, however,
is entitled to half of the property acquired during the marriage. 2 "" Thus, a
nonmarital partner recovering in quantum meruit would be in a better position
than a lawful spouse only if the reasonable value of services rendered less
benefits received exceeded the value of half the property acquired during the
relationship. Similarly, a plaintiff in a jurisdiction in which marital property is
divided in another manner would be in a better position than a lawful spouse
only if the quantum meruit recovery were greater than that which would be
received in a divorce settlement if the parties were married. Yet, the term
quantum meruit means "as much as he deserves." 2" ' Therefore, if the services
of the plaintiff, minus benefits received, entitle him to recovery greater than
he would receive in a divorce settlement, that is his right.
Application of the foregoing principles of contract law and quantum
meruit will ensure that the reasonable expectations of nonmarital partners will
be protected, and that one party will not be allowed to he unjustly enriched at
the expense of the other. In short, unmarried cohabitants will have the same
rights before the law as do any other unmarried persons. Consequently, rec-
ognized theories of equitable recovery should he available to unmarried
cohabitants as well. The theories of resulting and constructive trust suggested
by the California Supreme Court in Marvin are examples of recognized prin-
ciples which have been applied in the past to the claims of unmarried cohabi-
tants. 2 " 2 A court applying these and other accepted equitable remedies
should look to the statutes and decisions of its own jurisdiction in order to
determine the requisite standard of proof and the other elements of the
theory advanced by the litigants. It is suggested that, as a general principle,
courts should recognize and consider the value of homemaking services when
determining the respective contributions of the parties in acquiring real or
personal property. As the superior court noted in Marvin, when one party
performs domestic services, the other need not procure them at a price
elsewhere. 2F3 Thus, the purchasing power of the couple is enhanced through
the efforts of the homemaker. 284
2 i 7 See, e.g., Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. La.
1971) (reviewing trial court judgment determining damages fc . )r past physical and men-
tal pain, future physical and mental pain. future medical expenses, loss of earning
capacity, permanent disability and disfigurement).
25" 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 P.2c1 at 123, 134 Cal. Rpt.•. at 832.
25" See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 100. 69 P.2d 845. 847 (1937).
21 '" CAL.. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Stipp. 1980).
20 ' 131.,Acit's LAW DicrioNARv 1119 (5th ed. 1979),
2"2 See, e.g., Padilla v. Padilla, 38 Cal. App. 2d 319. 321, 100 P.2d 1093, 1994
(1940) (resulting trust); Outer v. Omer, I I Wash. App. 386, 393, 523 1 1 .2c1 957, 961
(1974) (constructive trust).
2"" 5 FAN ► . L. REP, at 3081. See Br uch „supm note 32, at 123,
2 " 5 FAm. L. REP. at 3084.
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The applicatiOn of recognized legal and equitable theories of recovery
will provide clear guidelines for judicial treatment. of the claims of unmarried
cohabitants. When such parties encounter a dispute concerning the division of
property acquired during the relationship, they can look for guidance to the
decisional law of their jurisdiction. The aggrieved party thus may bring action
under accepted theories of recovery in the case law, choosing the theory that
is best suited to the fact pattern of the relationship. Courts in turn will have at
their disposal an existing body of standards upon which to base their deci-
sions.
Of course, a court may have to resolve threshold public policy issues be-
fore determining that unmarried cohabitants will be allowed to seek relief in
the courts. 265
 Once these policy issues have been resolved, however, the
claims of nonmarital partners should be treated in the same manner as the
claims of any other unmarried persons. It follows that, just as the fact of
cohabitation in itself' should not be the basis for denial of recovery, recovery
should not be allowed on the basis of cohabitation alone. In the absence of
evidence that the parties entertained expectations of mutual financial benefit,
and in the absence of' evidence of unjust enrichment or other unfair dealings,
no relief should be granted. Such relief not only would contravene the inten-
tions of' the parties, but also would result in inconsistent treatment of the
claims of unmarried! cohabitants. Thus, courts should not make sweeping
statements authorizing the evolution of additional equitable remedies in the
case of unmarried cohabitants. A statement to that effect would only serve to
introduce further uncertainty into an area in which clear guidelines are re-
quired. The Marvin decisions illustrate the uncertainty that may result from
such an authorization. Although the California Supreme Court had em-
phasized that recovery should reflect the parties' expectations,'" its statement
that courts might fashion additional equitable remedies led to the superior
court award which in fact specifically contravened those expectations: 267 Strict.
adherence to traditional, recognized theories of recovery will enable courts in
other jurisdictions to avoid the problems in interpretation which resulted in
the anomalous decision of' the superior court in California.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin up-
held the rights of unmarried cohabitants to order their financial affairs as
they choose. That court attempted to provide a clear standard for courts to
apply in determining the financial rights and obligations of nonmarital
partners. The court. held that such parties should be treated as are any other
unmarried persons, and that recovery should reflect the parties' reasonable
expectations. When this standard was tested in the remanded Marvin action,
however, it did not prevent the trial court from awarding a marriage-like
remedy which did not reflect what it found to be the parties' expectations.
2 "' See text at notes 221-38 SUPM
2" 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 1) .2c1 at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rpm at 831-32.
2"7
 See text at notes 179-85 supra,
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The Illinois Supreme Court, by contrast, proclaimed in Hewitt that no
recovery for unmarried cohabitants would be forthcoming, absent a favorable
indication by the legislature. That court equated recovery with legal recogni-
tion of a relationship which it found to be clearly violative of Illinois law and
public policy. While the Hewitt decision was framed in terms of the law of that
jurisdiction, the policy issues raised in Hewitt —moral considerations and high
regard for the sanctity of marriage—echo some of' the concerns traditionally
advanced to deny recovery for non marital partners in other jurisdictions.
The increasing incidence of nonmarital cohabitation in the United States
suggests that courts often will be requested to determine the property rights
of such couples. ft remains to be seen whether a majority of these courts will
adopt the Marvin rationale and allow recovery that reflects the parties'
reasonable expectations, or will follow the lead of the Hewitt court in holding
that public policy would bar any and all recovery, This Note has proposed
that these courts apply recognized legal and equitable theories to the claims of
nonmarital partners. Such theories will provide guidance for the litigants and
the courts, and will ensure consistency in the treatment of unmarried cohabi-
tants. When the evidence in a particular case does not support the application
of a recognized theory of recovery, courts should not strain to provide relief.
These courts should take cognizance of the decisions of the California Su-
preme Court and the superior court in Marvin, and should be wary of au-
thorizing recovery beyond the scope of existing theories.
MARY DENEV1
